In this section, we outline a brief history of devolution in the UK, define our key working terms and begin to sketch out the current policy backdrop.

The UK is one of the most centralised nations in the OECDThis means that more decisions and laws effecting the population as a whole are decided in London than we see in other comparable nations around the world. 

In Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, most decision making takes place in the respective capital cities of Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast. 

The UK is also characterised by a range of severe and growing regional inequalitiesThese have a material impact on the life chances of people living in different parts of the country. 

These regional disparities are particularly pronounced when we look at the distribution of creative, cultural and heritage ecosystem and the infrastructures and the outcomes associated with them. 

Policy responses to the 2008-9 financial crisis, the UK’s departure from the European Union, the Covid-19 pandemic, war on our doorstep and further afield, and the ongoing cost of living crisis have contributed to a general feeling that the UK is caught in a ‘permacrisis’.

Public confidence in our national institutions and democratic processes have been in decline for some time now. Communities across the UK are grappling with finding new ways to insert themselves into local and regional policy dialogues in a bid to recalibrate a national system that doesn’t feel like it’s working for them. 

Some of the information in this section is drawn from a research paper by Jack Shaw, Eliza Easton and Trevor MacFarlane, commissioned as part of this programme.

The UK seems to be gripped by a devolution fever right now. But as Peggy Lee once famously said: “Fever ain’t a new thing – fever started long ago.”

We pick up the story of devolution in 1997 when a New Labour government won a landslide election on a promise to implement the most comprehensive constitutional reforms of the 20th century. This is widely accepted as the moment that the ‘devolution revolution’ kicked off of in the UK.

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland quickly took hold of unprecedented new powers across a wide range of policy areas and established their own parliaments in 1999. Antiquated privileges for hereditary peers in the House of Lords were abolished. The Greater London Authority was birthed in time for the turn of a new millennium. New national arts councils flourished in each of the four nations. Funding for the arts and culture in England doubled in just under ten years.

Today, the devolved governments of Wales, Scotland Northern Ireland are responsible for a range of policy areas. 

Powers that have been handed to the devolved governments are often described as ‘devolved’ whilst those that still sit with the UK Government are described as ‘reserved’ (with slight variations in language in Northern Ireland). 

Whilst individual settlements are complex and see some policy areas partially reserved and partially devolved, decision making powers are broadly distributed in the following areas:

Table of devolved Policy Areas: Fig 1: the distribution of devolved and reserved powers in the devolved administrations of the UK. Image: Culture Commons.

‘Sport and Culture’ are indicated as being devolved in all three devolved administrations. However, it is critical to note that this does not mean that the devolved administrations have full decision-making powers over all aspects of the creative, cultural and heritage ecosystem. For example, we know that trade, tax, employment and immigration policies – each set at the UK Government level – play an incredibly formative role in the ways the ecosystem manifests.

Since the reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s, successive UK governments have placed devolution at the heart of their policy offer to the country. The 2010 Conservative Party and Liberal Democrat coalition government resurrected ‘localism’ to include the voices of residents in neighbourhood planning. In 2014, the then Conservative Chancellor secured the first ‘handshake’ deal establishing the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) – the first region outside of London to take on new powers on spending in areas such as adult skills and transport.

In 2022, the Levelling Up white paper, the cornerstone of a ‘Levelling Up’ policy agenda, cemented the UK Government’s approach by offering up devolution to any part of England that wanted it by 2030. In the same year, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown launched a new report called ‘A new Britain: Renewing our democracy and rebuilding our economy’ (The Brown Commission). The report set out several recommendations about both the future of UK’s parliamentary machinery and extensive new powers for local government.

Within just under a decade, 12 areas across England had established a ‘devo-deal’ with Whitehall, including two advanced ‘trailblazer’ devolution deals including culture, creativity and heritage programmes in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands.

According to the Bennett Institute for Public Policy, 41% of the UK now lives in area with some form of devolution, which will increase to 52.4% if all new deals on the table are delivered on by the end of the decade.

In July 2024, a new UK Government was elected on a promise to make the change required to meet the ongoing challenges of our time. Of particular relevance to us is a firm commitment to extend devolution deals to any area that wants one.

In the already devolved nations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, decision makers have also signalled that they intend to distribute decision making to local authorities and the publics they serve. 

Fig 2: Show overlap between DCMS sectors. Image: Culture Commons. Note: we do not include sport, gambling or telecoms as sectors of focus in this paper.

The ‘Creative Industries’ were first mapped by the UK Government’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1998. 

In 2015, the DCMS adopted Nesta’s ‘Dynamic Mapping’ approach to define the creative industries, with an emphasis on subsectors with a higher percentage of the workforce employed in ‘creative occupations’. These creative occupations are ones with “a role within the creative process that brings cognitive skills to bear to bring about differentiation to yield either novel, or significantly enhanced products whose final form is not fully specified in advance”. 

The resulting subsectors range from architecture to software, publishing to film, but are bound together by a focus on creative practice; as a result of this focus, they share some distinctive characteristics such as a tendency to co-locate in specific places, create new intellectual property (IP) and have a higher prevalence of freelance and self-employed workers. 1

The DCMS definition is used in policy originating from Westminster, but there are slight variations in what is included in the definition of the Creative Industries in the UK’s constituent nations – for example the Scottish Government includes archives, antiques, textiles and cultural education in their definition, and the Creative Wales definition (also used by the Welsh Government) excludes computer consultancy activities but includes the manufacture of clothing and textiles. The Government in Northern Ireland primarily uses the DCMS definition.

The ‘Cultural Sector’ as defined by DCMS includes a broad range of subsectors including film, museums and heritage. 

As the intersecting sectors of the DCMS portfolio show (Figure 2), some parts of the Creative Industries and the Cultural Sector overlap, including a double overlap in the Digital Sector and Tourism portfolios. 

Whilst the heritage sector, visitor attractions and music shops are all considered part of the Cultural Sector, they are excluded from the DCMS definition of the Creative Industries because they aren’t considered to be primarily focussed on producing new ideas or products.

For the purposes of this report, we draw out Heritage in our description of the ecosystem for two main reasons.

While sectors are helpful to classify and identify at a national level to support appropriate policy interventions, it would of course be a mistake for any one group to try to draw up a definitive list of what constitutes ‘culture’, ‘creativity’ or ‘heritage’ per se. This is because they are derived from and shaped by all citizens, playing out in different ways across places and in different communities, and cannot be decided by a government department.

In practice, supply chains, workforces and outputs are often shared across the subsectors that make up the DCMS portfolio, and within the Creative Industries and Cultural Sector in particular. 

It is the combination of portfolio overlaps cited above and the many interdependencies between the creative, cultural and heritage sectors that have led us to apply a decidedly ‘ecosystem’ lens to this paper. Broadly speaking this includes:

  • firms in the creative industries (as defined by DCMS Standard Industrial Classification Codes)
  • the publicly and privately funded cultural sectors
  • arm’s length bodies (such as national arts councils)
  • tangible and intangible infrastructures (such buildings and networks)
  • grant giving bodies (such as trusts, foundations and philanthropy)
  • the workforce operating within the Creative Economy (i.e. workers within DCMS Standard Occupation Classification Codes) – including employed, freelance/self-employed and atypical workers
  • the public when engaging with or benefitting from the infrastructures and activities associated with the ecosystem
  • the research community (including schools, colleges, higher education institutions and informal sites of learning)
  • local, regional and national decision makers (e.g. in local authorities, combined authorities, national governments)

Despite the potential benefits of the creative, cultural and heritage sectors to all communities, the distribution of these sectors is markedly uneven across the UK. 

Around thirty per cent of those working in the creative industries in the UK are based in the capital, with the majority of GVA generated by the sector created in London (50.8% in 2022. For context, 23.7% of overall UK GVA was generated in London). 

The cultural sector is slightly more spread across the UK, but London is undoubtedly a hotspot of artistic activity, with around 28% Arts Council England National Portfolio, Investment Principles Support and Transfer Organisations for 2023-26 based in the capital, although many work further afield.

As a result, there have been calls for the redistribution of wealth and resources to help widen access to jobs in the sector and cultural experiences. However, there are challenges to realising this.

London isn’t just dominant in the UK – it is one of the most globally significant hubs for the cultural and creative sectors. For example, London is home to two of the ten most visited museums and galleries in the world. Since the creation of the British Fashion Council in the 1980s, London Fashion Week (LFW) has been regarded as the cornerstones of the global fashion calendar. 

The capital is also home to the two higher education institutions judged as best in the world in art and design, Royal College of Art (RCA) and University of the Arts London (UAL), as well as the world’s best performing arts school according to the QS rankings, the Royal College of Music.[1] 

The world’s highest grossing advertising agency group WPP, is also based in London, as are leading businesses in design, film, architecture, games and music. This means that policymakers have to balance the soft power and economic benefits of London as a global frontrunner, with the advantages of moving resources elsewhere within the UK.

Moreover, recent experience suggests that knee jerk approaches to redistribution of funding can have unintended consequences, including forced redundancies for workers during a cost-of-living crisis, and reductions in the amount of work that national organisations are able to do outside the capital. 

For example, in November 2022, Arts Council England announced its 2023-2026 Investment Programme which, directed by the Conservative government, included £56 million worth of cuts to London’s arts fundingIn response, Rufus Norris, then the Artistic Director of National Theatre, pointed out that the Theatre would actually be able to “do less work nationwide because of those cuts” as their grant and London-work was subsidising the valuable but costly work they do across the UK.

The Musicians Union have suggested that rather than focussing on the redistribution of relatively small pots of cultural funding, we should instead focus on the significant decrease in overall funding available as the core problem in realising the benefits of the cultural, creative and heritage sectors outside of the capital.

Each of the sectors that fall under the DCMS sectoral definitions are associated with a range of infrastructures that support their functioning. 

In some cases, these infrastructures are obvious and physical: for example, in the Film, TV, Music and Radio sectors, we might think about film, sound and recording studios; or in the Arts, Museums sectors, we can visualise gallery spaces, art works and the artefacts on display.

But if we drill right down even further, we can also begin to think about water, electricity and internet supply, and even transport infrastructures – each critical to so much of the activity and outcomes associated with the ecosystem. This is important in the context of this report because these infrastructures are also unevenly distributed across the UK.

Of course, what constitutes ‘infrastructure’ is evolving all the time as we learn more about how it interacts with different aspects of our daily lives. ‘Social infrastructure’ is a term now increasingly used to describe amenities like libraries, parks and public squares. More recently, ‘cultural infrastructure’ is being recognised as a potentially distinct category that could help the creative, cultural and heritage sectors anchor arguments about the different kinds of value that can be created in their day-to-day activities.

As the Bennett Institute for Public Policy outline in a blog piece for this open policy development programme, social and cultural infrastructures seem to share many infrastructural characteristics.

Pubs, community centres and sports grounds might be civic and social spaces, but they are also sites of cultural production and consumption. Equally, theatres, galleries and museums may be considered as cultural infrastructures first and foremost but are increasingly understood to play an important wider social and civic role, particularly as their roles and practices within communities change over time. The role that private sector spaces play as both social and cultural infrastructures are often underestimated.

Examples of important cultural infrastructures which don’t currently sit within DCMS definitions include leisure and community centres, pubs, green spaces and faith institutions; many of these spaces are also multi-purpose, hosting galleries, libraries, and community groups, for example. Further, ‘everyday creativity’ is increasingly understood to involve very small scale, non-institutionally supported and seldom formally recognised cultural activities in the home and private spaces. Sports too, have a clear cultural impact: both for those who participate directly in activities and clubs across the country, and for those who support their local or national sports people and teams.

‘Infrastructure’ as a policy framing has taken on a clear resonance within funding and policymaking circles. This is likely to be because of an increasing appreciation for the infrastructures that support the stability and capacity of sectors to innovate is fundamental to their success and ongoing contribution to the economy.

Of course, what’s “in” and what’s “out” when it comes to defining ‘cultural infrastructure’ is going to be a complex undertaking. Whilst assets more traditionally associated with certain parts of ecosystem might be easier to justify, there are clearly questions around the extent to which less obvious assets might increasingly feature, for example if we incorporate intangible heritage and human based network infrastructures. Equally, as our overall conceptualisation of what constitutes ‘culture, creativity and heritage’ broadens, presumably so too will our appreciation of what kinds of infrastructures will be needed to support them fully.

Funding for the UK’s creative, cultural and heritage ecosystem can come from a variety of sources – testament to the broad range of outcomes it thought to be able to bring about.

Public investment primarily comes from comes from:

  • UK and national governments who interact with the creative, cultural and heritage ecosystem including by consulting them, providing strategy direction, directing grant-in-aid, designing pilots and programmes, enforcing legislation (for example around Intellectual Property) and by providing loans (for example, as part of the Cultural Recovery Fund set up in the wake of the pandemic). Many initiatives may have their own objectives, and they don’t originate from a singular department. For example, in Whitehall, funding mechanisms from the Ministry for Housing, Communities, and Local Government have looked to the creative, cultural and heritage ecosystem to support their strategic objectives around improving pride in place and supporting communities. Non-departmental Government bodies like UKRI are also investors in culture through research grants, as well as direct support for businesses, with recent investments including the Creative Clusters Fund and the Creative Catalyst Programme.
  • Arm’s Length Bodies (ALBs) in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, such as Arts Council England, Sport Scotland and Screen NI who distribute grants to specific organisations over the longer-term and on a project-by-project basis.
  • The National Lottery, which is the state-franchised national lottery established in 1994 in the United Kingdom apportions 20% of the money it earns for expenditure on or connected with the arts, 20% for expenditure on or connected with sport and 20% for expenditure on or connected with national heritage.
  • Local government, which in all parts of the UK remains the largest public investor in UK culture, despite significant cuts to local culture budgets as a result of the decreasing overall funding settlement (between 2009-10 and 2022-23, per person in real term, local government revenue funding of culture and related services decreased by 29% in Scotland, 40% in Wales and 48% in England). Like other parts of government, local governments invest in culture for all kinds of different reasons including improving promoting civic pride, contributing to inclusive social and economic outcomes and addressing skills and health inequalities.

Like other areas of the economy, investment in the creative, cultural and heritage focussed companies can also come from private investors, including through crowdfunding, angel investment, corporate partnerships, commercial loans and venture capital. 

Foreign direct investment has been particularly critical for the UK’s film and television sectors who received £4 billion in 2023 which is now flowing into areas with historically low levels of support such as Barking and Dagenham (London, England) and Sunderland (North East, England) where 1,000 jobs are being created through the Pallion Shipyard Studios – the “world’s largest covered water studio”.

As cultural organisations deliver many positive societal benefits they may also receive funding from individual donors, endowments, trusts and foundations, legacies and corporate sponsorship. Community and voluntary sector stakeholders are also directly responsible for delivering a range of creative and cultural activities that don’t necessarily show up on a balance sheet.

More than anything, these divergent sources of funding are testament to the fact that – despite the breadth of subsectors that make up the creative industries and cultural sectors – they can, in the right circumstances, add significant value to the UK economy and its communities, with values that cut across multiple geographies, and government priorities.

The creative industries are now broadly established as an integral part of industrial policy and recognised as being able to support the reduction of place-based economic and social inequalities across the UK.

Despite the active role successive governments have played in supporting the creative, cultural and heritage sectors, there are also a number of serious challenges facing them, including issues which have been created or exacerbated by policy decisions.

One such example is the growing skills gaps, which many in the sector have long argued have been made worse by the sharp decrease in the numbers of people studying creative subjects at school in England, which have driven down UK-wide figures. Other areas of concern include sustainable funding for Public Service Broadcasting, a lack of innovation funding (with the Council for Science and Technology writing to then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to bring his attention to the disproportionately low level of investment in the sector) and a significant decline in the public funding available to cultural organisations.

In England, capital and revenue expenditure in the arts by local authorities has fallen by more than 48 per cent in real terms between 2009/10 and 2022/23 in response to an overall reduction in government investment in local authorities over the same period, as seen in Figure 2. Much of this comes from a significant drop in funding to libraries, although excluding libraries, evidence still points to a in real terms decrease in per person spend from £15.36 to £8.79.

Table of Falling Investment: Fig 3: Data from the Campaign for the Arts and the University of Warwick on the Local authority revenue spending on cultural and related services per person, 2009-10 to 2022-23 (real terms, 2022-23 prices)

Given local authorities are by some margin the most significant public investor in arts and culture in England, changes in their spending priorities can have a significant impact on the viability of the sector. 

At a more granular level, academics have set out the uneven spatial consequences of arts expenditure, with significant variation both between and within regions, which challenges commonly held assumptions which set up a ‘London versus the rest’ narrative.

In Scotland, local government is also the biggest funder of culture: the net revenue expenditure on ‘culture and related services’ from 2022-23 by its 32 local authorities was £651 million, which is ten-fold the settlement for Creative Scotland, at £63 million in 2022-23. Not only has investment significantly reduced (by 29% since 2009-10), the demand for services has also continued to rise in statutory services – such as homelessness and social care – and as a result local authorities have disproportionately had to reduce ‘unprotected’ services to balance their budgets.

In Wales, data from the Campaign for the Arts suggests that the real terms reduction in spending by local government on libraries, culture, heritage, sport and recreation may be as much as 40% since 2009/10. The impact of this is compounded by the fact that direct National Welsh Government support for the arts has reduced by £10 million in real terms since 2011-12.

Unfortunately, data from Northern Ireland detailing the exact breakdown of local government spending is less available – although it seems likely that cultural organisations have also seen a reduction in funding and that this may be about to get worse: we know that budgets for local councils are set to fall and that the Arts Council’s resource allocation for 2023-24 represented a 5 per cent cut based on the previous year’s allocation and further compounds the much longer-term disinvestment in arts funding.

Across the UK, this reduction in spending at the local level has affected the ability of local authorities to invest in culture directly, but indirectly it has also created a series of challenges, with decision makers reducing the amount they invest in the voluntary sector, which plays an important role in delivering cultural provision and, in some cases, renegotiating the taxes they charge cultural institutions.

English mayors representing combined authorities have up until this point played a relatively peripheral role in investment, but there is an emerging consensus that they have an important role to play in supporting the creative, cultural and heritage ecosystem.

Local government funding for culture is important because those who live in a place are often the best at understanding its unique traditions, needs and opportunities. Whilst it can leverage additional funding from public and private sources, it can also fund things which might not seem of consequence to those considering the national picture but are evidently important to those in a particular area, including making areas more attractive, fostering local communities, developing education programmes, acting as a site of democratic participation and improving local wellbeing.

The relationship between the creative and cultural sectors on the one hand and devolution on the other therefore cannot ignore chronic under-investment and uneven distribution of associated infrastructures across the UK. Given that most investment in culture in the UK is still decided at a local level, that this funding has been put under immense pressure as a result of wider policy decisions has had a significant impact on the sector.

In recent years other investments aiming to support culture at the local level have emerged – namely the UK Government’s UK City of Culture scheme, Towns Fund, Levelling Up Fund and Community Ownership Fund; Arts Council England’s ‘Priority Places’, Creative Scotland’s ‘Place Programme’, and Historic England’s Heritage Action Zones and High Street Heritage Action Zones programmes, 

However, many of these are competitive processes with outcomes decided in Whitehall, or by national Arm’s Length Bodies, and tend to invest in capital projects in specific areas for relatively short periods of time. Whilst welcome, they do not replace that long term revenue and capital investment in key local infrastructures. 

Those investments originating from Whitehall have also caused some controversy, as – for example –  the Welsh Government argues Wales will receive £772 million less funding through the SPF between January 2021 and March 2025 compared to the amount that would have been received through EU Structural Funds.

Understandably, polls in recent years have suggested that the UK public’s priorities for policymakers are the economy (specifically the ‘cost of living crisis’) and the National Health Service. Other policy areas that often surface as priorities for the public include immigration and housing.

Whilst they may not be a primary concern of voters under their own steam, the creative, cultural and heritage sectors are linked to each of these policy areas. This is particularly true of health policy, where there is increasing interest in the place of the arts and cultural organisations in supporting wellbeing and population health. It is important to note that in Ipsos’s 2022 Global Happiness survey, access to entertainment and sport was seen as more important than the state of the economy in its potential to make people happy.

However, interventions in areas like social prescribing have been challenging for NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups to take forward in full at a time when some warn that the foundations of the health service are crumbling. Nowhere is that more so than at a local level, where – for example – across the UK local government is struggling to balance more holistic interventions with specific needs for funding basic adult social care services.

Whilst it seems likely that concerns about the economy are driven by the individual impact of high inflation and stagnant productivity as opposed to an interest in specific approaches to fixing this, there could be a place here for the creative industries as levers of growth at all policy levels.

An area where there is significant public interest directed specifically at elements of the cultural sector is as a way to maintain or increase ‘pride in place’. A poll conducted by Public First in 2021 found that residents rated local heritage more highly than many other aspects of their town as a driver of civic pride, and that people have a strong, palpable, desire to foster a connection with their industrial history.

Given that the very nature of culture is hard to define, it also stands to reason that it is hard to comprehend the total level of cultural participation in the UK. This is because, for some, cultural participation might mean dancing in the living room, for others it might mean singing in church, and for others it might mean gardening. However, to give some sense of the importance of public support for the arts, it is useful to consider the level of participation in some arts, even if we recognise it doesn’t tell the whole story about the importance of culture in a place.

From the Participation Survey run by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (now the Department for Culture, Media and Sport) we know that in England during October 2021 to March 2022, over 4 in 5 adults had physically engaged with the arts (attended or participated) in the previous 12 months to being interviewed. This took many forms – from going to see a comedy show, to writing a short story. Just under one in four of adults in England visited museums and galleries, whilst almost two in three visited a heritage space.

The numbers in attending cultural events in Scotland in the 12 months before being interviewed in 2022 were comparable – with 88% of adults had been culturally engaged in the last year, either by attending a cultural event or place of culture or participating in a cultural activity. Just over one in four people in Scotland had attended a museum, and just under one in five had attended a gallery, whilst almost a third had been to a historic place.

In Wales, from 2022-2023, 72% of adults participated in ‘arts, culture or heritage activities’ more than three times a year.

In Northern Ireland, just over three out five adults (62%) had engaged in culture and arts in 2021/22 – a broad category including activities like craft, music, photography, as well as attendance at arts events and institutions.

One reason that the value of cultural organisations could be underestimated is that it can be particularly hard to quantify the complex and manifold benefits that free museums, historical buildings and access to other arts organisations bring to the communities they are part of, or the nation as a whole. 

For example, we know that people benefit from living in areas with cultural organisations even if they are not frequent visitors themselves (i.e. that people like to live in an area where others have access to them, or they are a visible part of the community) but that, like the importance of the natural landscape, this can be hard to measure

That is why the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has developed the Culture and Heritage Capital Programme, which is exploring methods such as ‘willingness to pay’ to demonstrate the many benefits of culture and heritage to people around the country.

We know that when the population at large are asked about what government priorities should be when it comes to spending on culture (according to some as yet unpublished data from Public First 2), historic buildings and monuments come out top, followed by smaller, local arts organisations and venues, like theatres and music venues around the country, local museums and art galleries and local cultural events and festivals. 

Campaigns to support the arts and culture involving the public have also seen recent success: for example, 25,000 people joined a campaign to support the cultural sector in Scotland following a U-turn on spending commitments, resulting in new commitments from the Scottish Government to maintain and grow public investment in the arts. Windsor and Maidenhead Council also abandoned plans for a 100% cut to the arts, and instead increased arts funding by 17%, after a local campaign was backed by more than 4,900 people.

Of course, it is also important to note that although local organisations come up as more popular recipients for public investment than national flagship organisations, they both exist within the same ecosystem – the National Theatre’s acclaimed War Horse might have started its life in London but throughout 2024 and 2025 will be touring around the UK, bolstering out-of-London organisations. Equally, many of the artefacts and exhibitions being displayed in our national museums are on loan from local civic museums based in areas outside of the UK’s core cities. ‘Standing at the Sky’s Edge’, a new musical about Sheffield, first appeared on stage at the Crucible in the city and is now running in the West End before it embarks on a national (and potentially international) tour.

Fundamentally, even if individual sectors don’t appear on the list of primary policy concerns for UK voters, there is every reason to believe that they contribute significantly to the way we feel about a place, and the way we feel in ourselves.

  1. The full list of sub-sectors is: advertising and marketing; architecture; crafts; design and designer fashion; film, TV, video, radio and photography; information technology, software and computer services; publishing; museums, galleries and libraries, and music, performing and visual arts.
  2. With thanks to Public First for sharing this data.